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Emotions Targeting Moral Exemplarity: 
Making sense of the logical geography of admiration, emulation and elevation 
  
Kristján Kristjánsson 
 
 
Abstract: Despite renewed interest in moral role modelling and its emotional underpinnings, 
further conceptual work is needed on the logical geography of the emotions purportedly 
driving it, in particular admiration, emulation and elevation. In this paper, I explore 
admiration (as understood by Linda Zagzebski) and Aristotle’s emulation in Section 2 and 
then elevation (as recently characterised by Jonathan Haidt) in Section 3. Although learning 
from moral exemplarity can, to a large extent, be accounted for on the motivational grounds 
of admiration and emulation, I argue that we need a concept of elevation (as a kind of moral 
awe) to account for attraction to transpersonal moral ideals. I explain Aristotle’s inability to 
make sense of people’s emotional attachment to moral exemplarity, as distinct from the 
attachment to moral exemplars. In Section 4, I bring to bear insights from another ancient 
emotion theorist, Mengzi (Mencius), in order to get Aristotle back on track. Finally, Section 5 
offers concluding remarks and a brief educational discussion.  
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1. Introduction: The Problematics of Moral Role-Modelling 
Role-modelling, especially of the kind that moral philosophers, moral psychologists and 
moral educators refer to as learning from moral exemplars or exemplarity, has been 
achieving renewed prominence of late. In the year 2015 alone, two thought-provoking books 
came out foregrounding the salience of moral exemplars for moral development: one popular 
(Brooks, 2015) and the other academic (Damon & Colby, 2015). More generally, exemplar 
research continues to form a major research agenda in moral psychology (see e.g. Dunlop & 
Walker, 2013), and the recently identified emotion of (moral) ‘elevation’ has been making 
headlines within positive psychology (Haidt, 2003; Algoe & Haidt, 2009). However, the 
most sustained interest in the topic can perhaps be seen among Aristotelian moral 
philosophers and educationists (Kristjánsson, 2007; 2015; Annas, 2011; Sanderse, 2013), as 
moral role-modelling constitutes a time-honoured staple of Aristotelian methods for 
cultivating character.  
 Recently, philosopher Linda Zagzebski has upped the theoretical stakes considerably by 
proposing a comprehensive new moral theory of ‘exemplarism’, according to which basic 
moral concepts are anchored foundationally in exemplars of moral goodness, tracked by the 
emotion of admiration, analogously to how proper names and the names of natural kinds are 
grounded according to a (Putnamian/Kripkean) causal theory of reference. Zagzebski goes on 
to make a distinction between exemplars admired for natural excellences and for acquired 
excellences (such as moral and intellectual virtues) and argues that the latter are ‘imitably 
attractive’, meaning that admiration for them (typically) provides motivation to emulate the 
admired person (Zagzebski, 2013; 2015a; 2015b; 2017). Zagzebski has already furthered the 
debate on the emotional basis of learning from moral exemplarity – the topic of the present 
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paper – and I return to her arguments at various junctures below although I refrain from 
assessing the whole new moral theory.  
 Zabzebski has entered a minefield, however, for the whole discursive field of moral role-
modelling is beset with practical (esp. educational) and theoretical problems. My present 
attention is fastened on a set of problems that are, at once, psychological and conceptual. 
What are the psychological (in particular, motivational and emotional) mechanisms driving 
the purported learning from moral exemplarity, and what sort of conceptual cartography (in 
particular, charting the territory of emotion concepts) is required to make sense of those 
mechanisms? My aim is to say something relevant about these two interlocking questions in 
what follows. These questions are particularly acute for neo-Aristotelians, for Aristotle 
simultaneously gave high priority to role-modelling as a method of character education and 
said preciously little about how it actually does, or should, take place. As Aristotelian 
character education seems most essentially, in its early stages at least, to be a process of 
emotional sensitisation, it is incumbent on Aristotelians to give a plausible account (for 
example, concurring or competing with Zagzebski’s) of how emotions motivate role-
modelling. However, in default of much advice from Aristotle himself about education for 
moral emulation, neo-Aristotelians have considerable reconstructive work on their hands. 
 In this paper, I explore admiration (as understood by Zagzebski) and Aristotle’s 
emulation in Section 2 and then elevation (as recently characterised by Jonathan Haidt) in 
Section 3. Although my conclusion is that learning from moral exemplarity can, to a large 
extent, be accounted for on the motivational grounds of admiration and emulation, I argue 
that we need a concept of elevation (as a kind of moral awe) to account for attraction to 
transpersonal moral ideals, and that making sense of elevation, on this understanding, may 
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help ameliorate some remaining problems in the other accounts. I explain Aristotle’s inability 
to make sense of people’s emotional attachment to moral exemplarity, as distinct from the 
attachment to moral exemplars. In Section 4, I bring to bear insights from another ancient 
emotion theorist, Mengzi (Mencius), in order to get Aristotle back on track. Finally, Section 
5 offers concluding remarks and a brief educational discussion.  
 In sum, the basic aim of this paper is to show that in order to give a full account of 
emotions targeting moral exemplarity, we need to go beyond both Aristotle and Zagzebski, 
and that Mengzi may be our best bet for starting to carve out an alternative route.  
 
2. Admiration and Emulation 
There are many concepts residing in the area of emotions targeting exemplarity. Amongst the 
services that philosophers attempt to provide is the refinement of conceptual understandings. 
Gilbert Ryle’s metaphor, about how critical analyses of concepts ideally need to be holistic 
with respect to the neighbouring conceptual terrain, is instructive here: ‘Surveyors do not 
map single objects like the village church. They put together in one map all the salient 
features of the area: the church, the railway, the parish boundary, and perhaps the contours. 
Further, they indicate how this map joins the maps of the neighbouring areas’ (2009, p. 211). 
Drawing on Ryle’s advice, this section and the next aim at a critical overview of the 
conceptual terrain; relying both on previous philosophical and psychological analyses. 
 If there is a ‘village church’ in this area, it must be the concept of admiration. Zagzebski 
has trimmed its ragged edges considerably of late (2015a; 2017). She understands admiration 
as a positive (pleasant) emotion, with contempt as its contrary, which construes the object as 
good in a distinctive way that is stronger and more basic than construing it as desirable. So, 
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contrary to what she takes to be the standard view, the desirable is grounded in the admirable. 
As already noted, she makes a distinction between admiration for natural and acquired 
excellences (especially virtues) – even hypothesising that they do not only ‘appear’ but also 
‘feel’ differently – and she considers the latter ‘imitably attractive’, in the sense that they 
(typically) give rise to the urge to imitate or emulate the object (2015a). She takes on board 
certain insights from the recent literature on elevation (see the following section) by 
accepting that admiration for virtue is often associated with the feelings of being uplifted or 
elevated. This is an important revision, for Zagzebski ultimately wants to collapse elevation 
into admiration (for virtue) by showing that the two emotions are identical. Her final move is 
that if agents endorse their emotion of admiration, upon critical reflection, they will use that 
as a ground for a judgement of admirability – a move which for Zagzebski eventually bridges 
the gap between emotion theory and moral theory, culminating in her new theory of 
exemplarism (2017).  
 There is a slide in Zagzebski’s account between admiration for excellences and 
admiration for people exhibiting those excellences, for she ultimately characterises 
admiration as an emotion of feeling in a distinctive way towards a person seen as admirable 
and refers to that person (rather than just her quality of excellence) as imitably attractive 
(2017, chap. 2). Zagzebski has ordinary language on her side here; it makes no clear 
distinction between admiration for persons and qualities. It would have been helpful if 
Zagzebski had provided an argument for why this distinction is irrelevant for her particular 
purposes; yet I will not fault her for that omission as I do not think this particular distinction 
is crucial to making sense of moral role-modelling along the admiration route. I go on to 
argue in Section 3, however, that another distinction, between admiration and elevation, is.  
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 Admiration is, for some reason, not one of the emotions analysed in Aristotle’s treatise on 
emotions and their use in rhetoric (2007). He uses considerable space, on the other hand, to 
dissect the emotion of emulation (zēlos). This emotion is characterised by  
a kind of distress at the apparent presence among others like him by nature, of things 
honoured and possible for a person to acquire, [with the distress arising] not from the 
fact that another has them but that the emulator does not (thus emulation is a good thing 
and characteristic of good people, while envy is bad and characteristic of the bad; for 
the former [person], through emulation, is making an effort to attain good things for 
himself, while the latter, through envy, tries to prevent his neighbour from having them) 
(Aristotle, 2007, p. 146 [1388a29–38]). 
 
 Interestingly, later in this same chapter, Aristotle considers contempt (kataphronēsis) the 
opposite of emulation, rather than (as Zagzebski does) of admiration. However, he makes a 
move with which Zagzebski would concur of claiming that those are emulated whom many 
admire or whom the emulators admire. Like her, Aristotle sees proper emulation as striving 
for qualities that are (seen as) ‘appropriate attributes of the good’ (2007, pp. 146–147 
[1388b4–8]). Moreover, he proposes the trait form of emulation – which we could call 
emulousness – as an age-relative virtue for young people (see Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 7): 
an integral ingredient in early moral education.  
As already noted, Aristotle remains reticent on how emulousness can be cultivated. In a 
previous work (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 7), I offered an optimistic take on this problem by 
suggesting that lightly touching up what Aristotle says about the emotion of emulation 
(zēlos) in his Rhetoric (2007), and bringing it into line with his general requirements of 
phronesis-guided education, would suffice to develop a coherent neo-Aristotelian account. 
Since then I have come to believe that more reconstructive work is needed to update Aristotle 
– the great cartographer that he was of moral reality – in light of new social scientific 
evidence and more recent analyses of emotion concepts. Indeed, no contemporary follower of 
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Aristotle would claim that we ought to retain his account in situ. More specifically, I now see 
three main stumbling blocks to understanding role-modelling through standard Aristotelian 
routes.  
 First, conceptually, emulation scarcely does all the work required to make sense of the 
psychological landscape. Emotion concepts that were not at Aristotle’s disposal (such as 
elevation) or of which he did not make explicit use (such as admiration) may be needed to 
supplement his account. Second, psychologically, the emotion of emulation does not suffice 
to explain the mechanism at work in various kinds of exemplarity-learning experiences, 
especially those having to do with sudden and dramatic moral conversions. Third, morally, 
standard Aristotelian accounts do not provide sufficient resources to counter two common 
objections to role-modelling. One concerns the way in which moral learning of this kind 
stands in danger of degenerating into mere hero-worship and uncritical grovelling at the feet 
of the presumed exemplars. The other objection concerns the threat of moral inertia, where 
the moral exemplars are seen as standing so high above the learner that idolising them 
becomes disempowering and dispiriting rather than uplifting. All those stumbling blocks may 
be grounded in Aristotle’s inability to make sense of people’s emotional attachments to 
moral exemplarity as distinct from the attachment to moral exemplars (see Section 3). Before 
making that argument, however, some further elaborations on Aristotle’s emulation concept 
are in order. 
Although Aristotle does define the affective part of emulation as one of ‘distress’, we 
should be cautious in characterising the emotion as a ‘negative’ on a standard psychological 
understanding. Emulation (zēlos) is (pace Zagzebski, 2015a, p. 210) not only painful; it also 
includes pleasure at the presence of ‘the honoured thing’; indeed, if the choice is between not 
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being able to acquire it for oneself versus being able to acquire it only by removing it from 
the emulated person, the emulator prefers the first option. Notice here that Aristotle did not 
share current psychology’s simplistic dichotomy of the ‘valence’ of emotions as either 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’, but seems to have considered most, if not all, emotions to be of 
mixed valence. The specific complication about the valence of emulation arises from the 
need to distinguish emulation both from begrudging spite (resenting the emulating person’s 
possession of the honoured thing) and envy (resenting the emulating person’s possession of 
the honoured thing and wanting to remove it from her to oneself).  
Zagzebski agrees with a strict distinction being drawn between emulation and envy; 
however, she prefers to see Aristotelian zēlos as a ‘form of’ or ‘at least a close relative of’ 
admiration (2015, p. 214). She implicitly exposes Aristotle’s mistake to combine within the 
rubric of zēlos both (1) the negative construal of oneself vis-à-vis the other person’s 
superiority and (2) the positive construal of the superior person, coupled with the positive 
striving to overcome that superiority. This odd mixture of construals and motives 
understandably troubles Zagzebski who stipulates that, in addition to the positive feeling of 
admiration leading to emulation, there is also a potential negative (painful) emotion that can 
lead to emulation, but an emotion which Aristotle also, confusedly, wants to call ‘emulation’ 
(Zagzebski, 2015a, pp. 210–211). Ideally, Aristotle should have made a distinction between 
the evaluative and motivational bits of emulation. He could have posited an emotion of 
admiration, perhaps of mixed valence, leading to emulation, or made a distinction (as 
suggested by Zagzebski) between admiration, experienced positively, and another emotion 
(unnamed), evaluating one’s relative standing negatively, also potentially leading to 
emulation. 
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Elsewhere (2017, chap. 6), Zagzebski quietly tidies up these infelicities in Aristotle by 
proposing a model according to which the process of role-modelling starts with admiration of 
an exemplar, which leads to a conception of oneself as lacking the admired qualities but 
desiring to possess them, which in turn produces emulation – and she suggests that this 
model can be combined with varieties of Aristotelian psychology. In what follows, I simply 
follow Zagzebski here, as there is much gained, and little lost, by distinguishing more clearly 
than Aristotle does between the evaluation of another’s relative excellence and the striving to 
become more like the other person. Indeed, I consider the assumption ultimately shared by 
Aristotle and Zagzebski – that the motivation to learn from exemplarity is adequately 
described as emulation, elicited by an evaluation of another person as admirable or 
honourable in certain ways – is more important than the subtle differences in their 
vocabularies. It is this assumption that I contest, however, in Section 3, by proposing another 
possible emotional route to learning from moral exemplarity. More specifically, what I 
contest is not the claim that the tidied-up Aristotle-Zagzebski route is the most common 
emotional route to learning from exemplarity. Indeed, my belief is, albeit in default of as-yet-
conclusive empirical evidence (see below), that it is the most common route. However, what 
I contest is the assumption that this route provides an exhaustive explanation of what goes on 
in emotion-inspired learning from exemplarity. 
It should be mentioned in passing that psychologists have studied one more psychological 
state that seems relevant to the present discussion: namely, inspiration. Where does that fit 
into the geography of our ‘parish’? In a persuasive analysis of the psychology of inspiration, 
Thrash and colleagues (2014) argue that inspiration is not a distinct emotion but designates a 
motivational state that can be part of various emotions. Inspiration incorporates, inter alia, 
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approach motivation, ‘such that one feels compelled to bring one’s new idea or vision into 
fruition’ (2014, p. 497). Couched in those terms, Zagzebski’s thesis could be restated such 
that admiration (for acquired excellences) typically inspires people to emulation.  
In sum, to round off this conceptual tidying-up work, admiration can most serviceably be 
understood as a pleasant (or perhaps a mixed-valence) emotion whose immediate target is 
another person and whose intentional object is that person’s excellence, positively evaluated. 
Typically, this emotion contains the motivational state of inspiration which then leads to 
emulation. Emulation is, in turn, a mixed-valence emotion whose immediate target is another 
person and whose goal-directed activity is the modelling of that person’s excellence.  
While this modestly revisionary analysis is of clarificatory value, it does little to fend off 
the two moral objections to role-modelling, identified at the end of the previous section. One 
of them was about how role-modelling can degenerate into mere hero-worship; the other 
about how acquaintance with the most pronounced moral exemplars can create moral inertia, 
rather than inspiration, if those are seen as occupying an unreachably high moral ground. 
Notice that Zagzebski’s empirical thesis (about the admiration-inspires-emulation effect) 
does not address, let alone parry, those objections. First, her thesis might be wrong (as 
demonstrated by future psychological experiments). Indeed, one empirical study has already 
cast doubt on it, indicating that a certain kind of envy, but not admiration, inspires emulation 
(van de Ven, Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2011). Second, even if the thesis turns out to be right (as 
indicated by another empirical study, showing admiration for virtue to be ‘profoundly 
motivating’: Immordino-Yang & Sylvan, 2010), her thesis is about what ‘typically’ happens. 
However, ‘typically’ leaves considerable room for exceptions. I take it that the objections in 
question are based on empirical hypotheses about what happens when people come across 
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true ‘moral superstars’. It could well be the case that on the rare occasions when we 
encounter the most admirable examples of moral excellence, inertia sets in and the 
admiration-inspires-emulation link becomes broken. That would be a most unfortunate 
conclusion for moral education, however, as it would mean that we should – counter-
intuitively – try to steer moral learners away from the most admirable exemplars of moral 
excellence.   
Meanwhile, Irwin (2015) has identified another moral problem connected to making 
admiration the wellspring of exemplar-based moral motivation – a problem that inter alia is 
meant to explain why the ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, did not place great stock in 
admiration. Irwin considers the problem to lie in the moral ambiguity of admiration. While it 
may be easy to distinguish conceptually, as Zagzebski does, between admiration for natural 
and acquired (virtuous) excellences, this is not easy in practice, especially not for moral 
learners. Morally dubious or conflicted characters in the classics, such as Ajax and Medea, 
are great and remarkable, with respect to natural excellences, ‘and so it is difficult to 
withhold admiration from them, even if we recognize that they are not the neighbours or 
fellow citizens we would want’ (Irwin, 2015, p. 231). In other words, admiration is a morally 
dangerous attitude, and this is precisely what repelled the ancient philosophers. Incidentally, 
Irwin does not only seem to be making a psychological observation here; he also takes 
indirect Euthyphro-style swipes at Zagzebski’s moral theory by warning against making 
admiration foundational to correct moral judgement. The order of justification must be the 
other way round – from the morally correct or virtuous to what is properly admired (Irwin, 
2015, pp. 235, 242, 247).  
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So far I have mostly confined my attention to philosophical studies of the concepts of 
admiration and emulation. One reason is that there is not a lot of conceptual work to draw on 
in this area carried out by social scientists. However, a recent extensive overview of the 
geography of admiration and adoration, whose main purpose is to make clear distinctions 
between the two (Schindler et al., 2013), constitutes a notable exception. The authors survey 
a lot of empirical and conceptual work in social science, and the upshot of their analysis is, as 
far as admiration is concerned, essentially consistent with Zagzebski’s account. Admiration 
turns out to be an emotion that ‘motivates the internalisation and emulation of ideals 
embodied by an outstanding role model’ (2013, p. 85). It constitutes a reaction to another 
person’s specific actions or characteristics. Meanwhile, adoration ‘motivates adherence to the 
teachings and expectations of a meaning maker and benefactor perceived as superhuman and 
sacred’ (2013, p. 85). So, while both emotions belong to the larger parish of ‘appreciation 
emotions’, they are separated by different targets and formal objects. Whatever the overall 
merits of this analysis may be, it helps us get a conceptual handle on the two common moral 
objections to role-modelling, as we can now rephrase them as variations on the theme that 
role-modelling stands in danger of degenerating into undue adoration. Hampering further 
psychological work in this area, however, is the lack of established instruments to measure 
admiration, emulation and adoration (yet see Sarapin et al., 2015 for an attempt at a 
multidimensional admiration scale; cf. the discussion in Onu, Kessler & Smith, 2016). 
 
3. Elevation as Moral Awe 
Jonathan Haidt created considerable buzz in 2003 when he identified and characterised 
‘elevation’ as a specific emotion: one which intellectually minded people, such as Thomas 
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Jefferson, had described in vivid terms over the centuries – as ‘dilating the breast’ and 
‘elevating the sentiments’ (cited in Haidt, 2003) – but which academic emotion theorists had 
for some reason failed to recognise. Touching a chord with various researchers, elevation has 
since 2003 developed into an important research topic, especially within positive psychology. 
While Haidt is onto something important in his identification of elevation, I argue that he has 
misrepresented it. To make my case, we need to untangle his conceptual account.  
 Elevation, is according to Haidt, an other-praising emotion elicited by acts of virtue or 
moral beauty, causing warm, open feelings in the chest and motivating people to improve 
themselves and behave more morally through emulation (2003, pp. 275–276). The word ‘or’ 
is crucial here, for it seems that Haidt is describing two distinct emotions rather than just one. 
For convenience of exposition, let me call them elevation1 and elevation2. Elevation1 is an 
emotion of appreciation of personal acts of virtue. It is triggered by acts of charity, gratitude, 
fidelity or any other strong display of virtue that do not directly benefit the self; it leads to 
distinctive physical feelings and elicits the above-mentioned motivation of emulation (Algoe 
& Haidt, 2009, pp. 106–107). Elevation2 is an emotion of appreciation of the transpersonal 
moral beauty of goodness/virtue. It is connected to awe, self-transcendence and spirituality, 
even aesthetic appreciation, and could perhaps be named tugendfreude (as opposed to 
schadenfreude): joy in virtue (Haidt & Keltner, 2004).  
 Haidt makes two general claims about all elevation to which I take exception. One is that 
elevation connects to the moral-domain dimension of purity/degradation: a genetically 
grounded but culture-modified source of individual moral difference. People prone to 
elevation will then tend to be high on the purity scale – and the contrary of elevation is seen 
as disgust (Haidt, 2003). This looks like an ad hoc move to bring the emotion of elevation 
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into line with Haidt’s controversial general theory of moral foundations or domains. The 
contrast with disgust also seems to make elevation too visceral. I would argue – as Aristotle 
did for emulation and Zagzebski for admiration – that the contrary of elevation be better seen 
as contempt than disgust. The second claim is to restrict elevation to experiences of goodness 
that do not directly benefit the self (Haidt, 2003; Algoe & Haidt, 2009, p. 107). Haidt is 
motivated to make this move in order to separate elevation from the other-praising emotion 
of gratitude (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). However, Haidt seems to under-appreciate the possibility 
of separate emotions co-occurring, even synergistically. There is no reason why feeling 
gratitude towards a benefactor, at an act of goodness directed at oneself as beneficiary, rules 
out the possibility that one also experiences elevation1. If anything, one emotion is likely to 
amplify the other. Similarly, it seems unreasonable to suppose that elevation2 cannot co-exist 
happily with dyadic gratitude (gratitude without a specific benefactor, also known as 
‘appreciation) or, more specifically, with what Roberts (2014) calls ‘cosmic gratitude’.  
 These can perhaps be seen as side-concerns. The main concern, however, is that Haidt 
does not seem to be aware that he is combining two distinct emotions, with different targets 
and objects, under one umbrella. There is a dilemma lurking here. The first horn is that if 
‘elevation’ is to be understood as elevation1, it seems to be redundant with respect to 
‘admiration’. As Zagzebski correctly points out, elevation (qua what I call elevation1) is 
perfectly captured by her notion of ‘admiration for moral excellences’ (2015a, p. 209). Algoe 
and Haidt (2009, p. 107) admit that ‘admiration’ is sometimes used in ordinary English as a 
name for a response to moral exemplars, but they decide ‘for the purposes of [their] studies’ 
to define ‘admiration’ as a response to non-moral excellence only, but ‘elevation’ as a 
response to moral excellence. Again, this decision (uncritically adopted e.g. by Onu, Kessler 
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& Smith in their 2016 conceptual model) seems to be taken ad hoc. There is normally no 
good reason to correct ordinary language for failure to distinguish between varieties of an 
emotion simply on grounds of different specific targets. If we insisted on such a separation, 
the emotional vocabulary would proliferate ad infinitum. There would have to be a special 
name for anger at school bullying as distinct from anger at rudeness on the bus, etc.  
The issue here is that there does not seem to be any difference between ‘admiration’, as 
applied in ordinary language and subtly refined by Zagzebski, and ‘elevation’ (qua 
elevation1), except that ‘elevation’ is being used for a specific nuance of admiration, and 
perhaps also a nuance characterised by unusually intense feelings, but neither feature 
constitutes a sufficient reason for a new word, let alone an analysis of a new emotion. 
Elevation1 could simply be referred to as ‘moral admiration’, ‘passionate moral admiration’ 
or something similar, when needed for the sake of clarity. The second horn of the dilemma is 
that if elevation is understood as elevation2, much of what Haidt says about the nature of 
elevation in general does not hold. It is not targeted at persons or individual acts of goodness, 
but must rather be understood and analysed as a specific kind of awe, as I explain later in this 
section. In either case, Haidt’s general account of elevation seems to rest on a specious 
conceptual foundation. 
 The identification of elevation has spawned considerable empirical research. Algoe and 
Haidt (2009) have conducted studies showing subtle differences between experiences and 
motivational correlates of elevation, gratitude and admiration (with admiration understood in 
their own restrictive way). Siegel, Thomson and Navarro (2014) also reveal how elevation 
typically results in different behavioural responses from gratitude. Schnall, Roper and 
Fessler’s (2010) experiments showed that feelings of elevation, but not of mere amusement 
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or happiness, predict altruistic and helping behaviour. Landis and colleagues’ (2009) study 
suggests that elevation has significant incremental validity in predicting (self-reports of) 
prosocial behaviour over and above the Big-Five Model. All these findings are interesting, 
but as elevation is usually, in these experiments, triggered by visual materials, it is not clear 
whether the participants are fastening on the personal or transpersonal nature of the moral 
goodness on display. In other words, we do not know whether the found effects are due to the 
experience of elevation1 (namely moral admiration) or elevation2 (namely moral awe).  
 I submit that Zagzebski’s conceptual account of admiration, discussed in Section 2, tells 
us most of what we need to know conceptually about elevation1, and she proposes various 
credible empirical theses which could explain at least some of the psychological findings 
above. I do want to argue also, however, that both Zagzebski (on admiration) and Aristotle 
(on emulation) ignore another possible route to learning from moral exemplarity and that 
there is, indeed, space for the concept of elevation (qua elevation2) to capture that route.  
To illustrate my case, let me begin with an anecdotal example from my own life. During 
a gap year as a 20-year old, I unwisely took up a job as a high-school teacher. Having to 
teach seriously disruptive students without being prepared to do so through either experience 
or training, this one-year of work stretched my mental and physical resources towards the 
breaking point. I was basically at my wits’ end. My father watched my gradual mental 
deterioration from close by but without being able to do anything substantial to remedy the 
situation. Probably out of a sense of despair, more than anything else, he bought me an 
expensive watch. When he passed it on to me, without a word, I immediately sensed what 
had happened. I felt an overpowering sense of elevation – not so much in the form of moral 
admiration at my father’s gesture or a desire to want to emulate him as a moral exemplar 
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(although those emotions featured also), but rather by way of intense appreciation that such 
depth of goodness could exist in the world. At the philosophical risk of ‘having one thought 
too many’, my most profound emotion was thus directed at the ideal of moral goodness 
rather than at my father as a person. Moreover, I felt motivated to strive for such goodness 
myself because of the attractiveness of the relevant ideal rather than its attractiveness through 
the mediation of my father.  
 Although I consider Haidt’s analysis of elevation to be undercut by various infelicities, he 
does, in my view, have a point that there is a route towards moral motivation via the 
exemplarity of sheer moral beauty. Drawing on Plato’s triad of the true, good and beautiful, I 
would hypothesise that (moral) elevation (in the elevation2 sense to which I confine myself 
henceforth) is one of the three main members of the emotional family of awe, the others 
being intellectual elevation, in the face of overpowering truth, and aesthetic ecstasy, when 
confronted with great works of art. Confining the use of ‘elevation’ to elevation2 makes sense 
of the dramatic feelings that Haidt associates (wrongly) with all elevation, as such feelings 
are well known characteristics of awe. The object of elevation, on this account, is captured by 
the cognition that the subject is experiencing an instantiation of a truly great moral ideal that 
is mystifying or even ineffable in transcending more mundane, everyday human experiences. 
This experience will be perceived to have increased existential awareness and connected the 
subject to a greater whole. Most importantly, perhaps, the target of elevation is not another 
person but a transpersonal ideal (see further in Kristjánsson, 2016a). 
 Zagzebski complains that Aristotle and Aristotelians neglect admiration (2015a, pp. 206–
207). We saw earlier how Irwin (2015) explains this apparent neglect. In any case, as I 
pointed out in the previous section, this lacuna may not be essential from a motivational point 
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of view as Aristotle did give a detailed account of the emotion of emulation, inspired by the 
appreciation of ‘honoured things’ (although he considered the valence of the appreciative 
part mixed or painful rather than pleasant). Much more significant, psychologically and 
morally, is the absence of awe in general and elevation in particular from Aristotle’s account 
of the emotions. When one looks at the emotions that Aristotle describes in the Rhetoric 
(2007), those fall broadly into three categories with respect to their targets: emotions directed 
at oneself (like pride), at other people (like emulation) or at external events (like fear). 
Notably missing from this list are emotions directed at transpersonal (non-self-or-selves-
directed) ideals or idealisations, such as beauty, truth and goodness. There is thus no awe – 
either inspired by a heightened sense of beauty in art/nature, the immensity of the universe or 
the goodness of an ideal of self-sacrifice.   
This is, by no means, a novel observation (see further in Kristjánsson, 2016b). 
Aristotelian scholars such as Broadie have long acknowledged that some sides of human 
nature are ‘largely unexplored’ by Aristotle, sides such that, in addition to being rational, we 
are also ‘spiritual beings, responsive to beauty, imaginatively creative’ (1991, p. 36), without 
awareness of which any account of human nature becomes deflated and incomplete. Latter-
day theorists have identified the parts missed by Aristotle in human beings’ deep-seated 
orientation or urge – sometimes referred to as ‘a transcendent urge’ – towards extraordinary, 
idealised experiences (see various references in Kristjánsson, 2016b). The good news, 
however, is that Aristotle’s uncompromising naturalism – the view that all moral theorising 
must be answerable to empirical evidence – allows us to update Aristotelianism in light of 
new findings. If it is really true that the fullness of a life well lived cannot be achieved 
without experiences of elevation, then the Aristotelian naturalistic theory requires that 
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flourishing be partly constituted by the presence of the relevant emotional trait – and that 
moral education be designed such as to cultivate this trait (see Section 5). 
 My account of elevation suggests a route beyond Aristotle and Zagzebski: the route of 
steering our minds towards transpersonal moral ideals. I am not saying that this is always the 
best route – indeed, the routes suggested by Aristotle and Zagzebski are probably both more 
common, as I conceded earlier, and in many cases more practical – but I do suggest that it 
constitutes an alternative route to moral motivation, worthy of consideration and cultivation 
in character education. To prevent misunderstanding, in so far as my suggestion here is 
psychological rather than normative, I propose it (just like Zagzebski does with hers) as an 
empirical hypothesis. I can envisage a number of psychological experiments that could 
separate out whether it is the exemplar or the ideal of exemplarity that motivates moral 
learning: namely, admiration/emulation or elevation. Indeed, one feature of Zagzebski’s 
approach that is ‘imitably attractive’ is her willingness to enter a literature from which many 
philosophers are inclined to bail out, namely that of emotion research in social science, and 
her presentation of some of her main claims as empirical theses, to be corroborated by social 
science, rather than as ‘conceptual truths’. 
Notice two things about the account I have suggested. First, it may indicate a way to 
bypass both moral admiration and emulation (in the synthesised Aristotle-Zagzebski sense) 
through direct inspiration by abstract ideals. A simpler interpretation would be that, in my 
account, elevation just replaces admiration. So instead of being positively attracted to (the 
qualities of) a moral exemplar through admiration, which then inspires emulation via the 
negative construal of your inferiority, you become attracted to an abstract ideal which 
inspires emulation through the realisation of how badly you match up to it. However, there is 
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something odd about the idea of emulating an abstract ideal, and the oddity is – I submit – 
not only linguistic. Consider here the enigma of sudden epiphanic moral conversions or 
‘Damascus experiences’. A shared assumption of the otherwise radically opposed 
Aristotelian and Kantian theories of moral development is that the process of learning from 
moral exemplars (in Aristotle) or mastering moral reasoning skills (in Kohlberg) is a slow 
and laborious one. However, that assumption seems to fly in the face of actual, if rare, eureka 
moments when people see the moral light, so to speak, in a flash and mend their ways 
accordingly. A more Platonic understanding of elevation may offer an explanation here, 
according to which you can grasp and embrace an ideal epiphanically and spontaneously, 
without the mediation of Aristotelian emulation. I acknowledge, however, that accounting for 
such experiences requires an alternative developmental and educational story to the one 
provided in standard Aristotelian accounts of character education – and one that cannot be 
provided within the confines of the present paper.  
Notice, second, that the elevation route I have sketched here towards learning from moral 
exemplarity may avert some of the problems attached to role-modelling. There is no danger 
of it being reduced to fawning hero-worship, for there is no person (and hence no hero) to 
worship. Also there is no danger of feeling that someone is better than one could imagine 
oneself being, as there is no person to whom to compare oneself. However, someone could 
point out that although those particular problems have been averted, they have been replaced 
with analogous – and perhaps even more debilitating – ones, marring our relationship with 
abstract ideals. Thus there may be a ‘mere ideal-worship’ objection that is the analogue of the 
‘mere hero-worship’ objection and vis-à-vis which my account is no better off than 
Zagzebski’s. A similar point applies with respect to the ‘moral inertia’ objection. Again, one 
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can readily imagine that when contemplating an ideal of beauty, truth or goodness, a person 
might be motivationally constrained or inert on account of thinking that she could never 
exemplify such a high standard. In fact, my account may seem to be worse off than 
Zagzebski’s on this point. Exemplars, at least, are personal. One might think, then, that for 
any given person, the perceived gap between herself and an exemplar would be somewhat 
less than the perceived gap between herself and a transpersonal ideal.  
As Zagzebski herself would be the first to acknowledge, those are empirical hypotheses 
that only admit of a social scientific resolution. In default of any known research into the 
comparative effects of personal exemplars versus abstract ideals, I can only offer the 
following two quick considerations. First, one of the main reasons why hero worship is seen 
as a danger for role modelling is that the learner becomes tempted to emulate the hero as a 
whole, warts and all, rather than just the admirable qualities. So, for example, ‘Beliebers’ 
(Justin Bieber fans) become induced to emulate his antics rather than just admiring him for 
his music. At least in the case of ‘ideal worship’, this worry will not arise. Second, regarding 
moral inertia, it is true that someone can easily feel overwhelmed by a moral ideal, no less 
than a moral exemplar, and find it beyond practical reach. Yet it is an old platitude of sports 
psychology that learners are less likely to feel disempowered if they focus on a difficult goal, 
rather than on the star performers who have already mastered the goal, and I hypothesise that 
the same could apply here regarding idealised persons versus ideals. However, at the 
moment, I have nothing but intuition and anecdotal evidence to rely upon.  
One problem that the elevation route does not solve, however, is the one identified by 
Irwin in the case of admiration: the danger that elevation, no less than admiration, can 
mislead our moral sentiments (Irwin, 2015, p. 241). It could even be reasonably argued, with 
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references to stark examples from recent world history, that the attraction to abstract ideals 
constitutes a more potentially misleading source of motivation than attraction to individual 
exemplars. I am not sure how any theory of moral motivation and moral learning can avert 
this problem. This is precisely why Aristotle focuses on the development of the meta-virtue 
of phronesis as an arbitrator, to the adjudication of which all moral learning needs in the end 
to be subjected. Stripped of phronesis, neither admiration/emulation nor elevation have an 
inbuilt mechanism directing them unproblematically towards overall moral value. 
I want to end this section by anticipating one possible Zagzebski-inspired objection. The 
objection would be that the distinction between learning from exemplarity and from 
exemplars is specious because one can only access the former through the medium of the 
latter (namely, exemplarity displayed by exemplars). Now, it may well be that experiences of 
moral exemplarity are parasitic, causally and biographically, upon experiences of moral 
exemplars – although the following section will cast a doubt on that. However, even if that is 
the case, Zagzebski’s thesis is stronger: it is about moral concepts being grounded 
foundationally in the emotion of admiration that has moral exemplars as its target. But if my 
argument can be sustained, another emotion, namely elevation, can home in on moral 
exemplarity directly, by targeting an ideal, not a person.   
 
4. Complementing Aristotle with Mengzi (Mencius) 
We are so used to virtue ethicists promoting character-education theories based on learning 
from moral exemplars (although rarely, perhaps, in such a foundational sense as in 
Zagzebski’s moral theory) that we can hardly think of an alternative, without falling back on 
Platonic rationalism. My recourse to Plato on the good, true and beautiful above must not be 
22 
 
understood, however, as a plea for a Platonic theory of moral learning. Apart from the 
metaphysical queerness of the ‘forms’ to which we are supposed to be attracted, the 
attraction in question is not an emotional attraction in Plato; hence, the very feature of virtue 
ethics that draws many people towards it, namely its capacity to make sense of the moral and 
educational salience of our emotional lives, is lost. Yet I also suggested above that Aristotle 
got a chunk of his psychology of human emotions wrong. In a previous publication on how 
to tidy up Aristotle’s emulation (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 7), I explored the possibility of 
drawing upon insights from Chinese philosophy, more precisely from the teachings of Mozi. 
I now think I chose too soft an example. Mozi was a quasi-utilitarian, and utilitarians tend to 
be fairly relaxed, in any case, about embracing transpersonal moral ideals, such as Mozi’s 
‘universal love’. We would benefit more from complementing Aristotle with insights from 
fellow virtue ethicists. In Chinese philosophy, there are obvious candidates for that role, 
namely Confucius and his disciples, in particular Mengzi who foregrounded the emotional 
side of morality more than his master.  
In recent moves that slacken the Aristotelian monopoly on virtue ethical theory, it is 
becoming fashionable to juxtapose Aristotelianism and Confucianism and, while pointing out 
the remarkable similarities between their virtue systems, to suggest that each can learn from 
the other as a ‘mirror’ (Yu, 2007, p. 4). In particular, it has been suggested that Confucian 
‘aestheticism’ may provide resources for Aristotelian ‘theoreticism’, both in making sense of 
our relationship with nature and our attachment to transpersonal ideals (Sim, 2007, pp. 2–3, 
131, 211). Yet Confucius’s own conception of the ultimate moral exemplar, the jūnzǐ, and 
how we acquire moral wisdom by admiring and emulating him, does not seem to offer a 
significant addition to Aristotle’s conception of the phronimos and our zēlos directed towards 
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him (Yu, 2007). For present purposes, I have therefore been persuaded (by Kim, 2008, and 
Philip Ivanhoe, personal correspondence) that Mengzi (c. 372–289 BC) makes for a more 
interesting critical ‘second-self’ friend to Aristotle.  
Mengzi is most famous perhaps for his theory of the innate goodness of human beings, 
traditionally contrasted with Xunzi’s view of the inherent badness of human nature. This 
innate goodness, which then simply needs to be drawn out and polished, is  grounded in the 
moral ‘sprouts’ (incipient virtue traits) of benevolence (an inadequate translation of rén), 
righteousness (yì), propriety (lǐ) and wisdom (zhì), Mengzi also argued that each of the 
sprouts had a root/germ in a specific emotion (2009, pp. 21, 72 [2A: 6.4–6.5, 6A: 6.7]) and 
that the main role of moral education was to nourish those emotion-cum-virtue (‘heart-mind’) 
seedlings, without pulling on them too hard and thereby uprooting them (2009, p. 17 [2A: 
2.16]).  
Debates rage about Mengzi’s general emotion theory (see e.g. Wong, 1991; Chan, 2006; 
Kim, 2008), an engagement with which would take us too far afield. What matters for present 
purposes it to explore the emotional germ of jìng which is (emotionally, foundationally) to lǐ 
what compassion is to rén; in other words, jìng forms a heart-mind dyad with lǐ. Now, jìng 
cannot be given a standard translation across the board. Depending on the context, it can 
mean ‘respect’, ‘deference’, ‘reverence’, ‘admiration’ or ‘awe’. In many of these contexts, 
jìng is simply directed at admirable individuals (elders, sages) and/or the exemplary rites and 
rituals to which they adhere. In other contexts, however, jìng arguably comes close to 
capturing the essence of elevation (i.e. elevation2) as developed in the previous section, by 
recognising/appreciating the worth of transpersonal ideals, and doing so in an intense (awe-
struck) way. Mengzi talks about how ideals such as order and righteousness ‘delight our 
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hearts like meat delights our mouths’ (2009, p. 73 [6A: 7.8]). In Aristotle’s emulation, by 
contrast, the ‘wow factor’ of an intense sensibility response is missing. Chan argues that, in 
Mengzi, worth or merit as such (including the worth of virtue), as an exalted, transcendent 
ideal, is the ultimate ground for jìng, rather than any worthy individuals (2006, pp. 234–235; 
cf. Kim, 2008, p. 188, although Kim [personal correspondence] does think that Mengzi also 
allowed for awe directed at exceptional individuals). Through jìng, one befriends, so to 
speak, ‘the Virtue of another person’ rather than the person herself (Mengzi, 2009, p. 64 [5B: 
3.1]).  
This attraction to the transpersonal emerges most conspicuously in references to jìng 
towards Heaven and the Way (Philip Ivanhoe, personal correspondence; cf. Mengzi, 2009, p. 
79 [7A: 1]). Heaven (Tiān) is an impersonal force ordering the universe, responsible for fate 
and the Way, and a transcendent anchorage of morality. The Way (Dào), in turns, refers to 
the right way to live and guide our lives. Notice that both concepts have a place in 
Confucianism in the absence of any explicit theology, and they are understood there in a 
somewhat mundane sense, quite similar to the sense that many contemporary Westerners 
ascribe to a putative principle of deservingness in the world where people generally get their 
due in the end, without the need for any god(s) meting it out (see Kristjánsson, 2006, chap. 
4.2, on the ‘belief in a just world’). Transpersonal ideals such as worth or desert can thus be 
seen as sources of moral value, at which one may stand in awe, without the need for any 
particular person, human or divine, at whom to direct admiration. Intense elevation, in the 
face of such ideals, may help to explain the phenomenon of epiphanic moral conversions 
which, as already noted, remains an enigma for Aristotle-inspired theories of moral 
education. Indeed, clear similarities can be found here between Mengzi’s view and that of the 
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humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow, whose research into ‘peak experiences’ (1964) 
gave impetus to the fringe movement of ‘transpersonal psychology’.  
Obviously, Confucian scholars carved up the emotional landscape quite differently from 
either Aristotle or us moderns, and the fact that a concept such as jìng has no straightforward 
counterpart in either Aristotle or modernity should perhaps make us more humble about the 
possibility of philosophers fashioning a universally reasonable and applicable emotional 
vocabulary. Nevertheless, I have attempted in this section to illuminate my case for elevation 
from Section 3 by showing how it can make full sense, in a virtue ethical system, to be 
inspired by transpersonal ideals of moral exemplarity.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The scorecard, on balance, looks like this. I have argued that, in their different ways, both 
Aristotle and Zagzebski get their psychology of role-modelling right – minor squabbles aside 
– and that by synthesising their accounts of admiration and emulation, we can strike the 
keynotes in explaining the process of emotional attachment to exemplarity. However, at the 
same time, I have suggested that both authors may have missed an important, if perhaps less 
frequently taken, alternative route to moral learning from exemplarity – an awe-inspired 
route that bypasses the attachment to moral exemplars and is, rather, about direct attachment 
to transpersonal moral ideals. I have explained why Aristotle may have missed this route; it 
connects to a general lacuna in his understanding of human nature. Furthermore, I have 
suggested a role for an amended version of Haidt’s emotion of elevation (qua emulation2) to 
account for awe-inspired role-modelling, and I have illuminated my case by drawing on a 
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close contemporary of Aristotle in China – and a virtue ethicist to boot – Mengzi, to explain 
how elevation can fit into a virtue ethical system. 
 If this argument holds water, Aristotelians will need to acknowledge that a medial 
(‘golden-mean’) trait form of elevation, no less than a medial form of emulousness, 
constitutes (part of) a virtuous moral disposition for moral learners. This means learning to 
be properly attracted to the right sort of moral ideals at the right times, in the right 
proportions, steering clear of both excessive romanticism about ideals and debilitating 
cynicism or philistinism (Kristjánsson, 2016a). From the standpoint of character education, it 
will then presumably be incumbent on teachers to expose students to examples of moral 
ideals, from great works of literature, the arts, religious and secular texts, etc., hoping that by 
feeding on such a diet, they will grow the relevant virtuous emotional disposition 
(Kristjánsson, 2016b). For example, being exposed to and induced to reflect upon Caspar 
David Friedrich’s great 1818 painting, Wanderer above the Sea of Fog, may be more 
conducive to the cultivation of awe-like elevation in students than reading about the lives of 
particular exemplars attracted to and exemplifying moral elevation. 
Here, however, we encounter a problem that is not confined to the learning of proper 
emulation or elevation but is rather endemic to all Aristotelian (and indeed all virtue-ethical-
cum-character-based) moral education. Very little specific advice tends to be given about 
how best to cultivate emotional dispositions. To be sure, we can divine from Aristotle’s 
discussion of early-years habituation that emotional development is essentially triggered in 
the very young through emotional contagion, and he does make some cryptic remarks in his 
Politics about how (older) learners can use music to balance their emotions and move from 
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mere continence to virtue. But beyond that, Aristotle is short on specifics and we know for 
example little about the details of phronesis-guided emotion education. 
 Confucian scholars suggest that Aristotelians can learn salient lessons from Mengzi here 
again, as the latter is famous for his account of emotional learning qua emotional extension 
(tuī). On this account, the trick is to help the learner settle on an understanding of why an 
emotion is on target in a paradigmatic situation and then to learn to extend this understanding 
gradually to non-paradigmatic cases – hoping that the feeling accompanies the cognition in 
extending the boundaries of the whole emotion. This account is illustrated through a number 
of stories, the most famous one being about a ruler feeling compassion for an ox but, 
irrationally or self-deceivingly, not able to extend this compassion to the plight of his 
subjects (Mengzi, 2009, pp. 5–8 [1A: 7]). Unfortunately, Mengzi scholars disagree radically 
about the correct interpretation of ‘extension’: whether it essentially a logical extension (of 
extending understanding), an emotive extension (of extending sensitivity) or both at the same 
time (see Kim, 2008, chap. 6, for a thorough review; cf. Wong, 1991). In any case, the 
extension evidently needs reflection on relevant moral similarities and differences (Mengzi, 
2009, pp. 72, 75 [6A: 6.7, 15.2]) – which takes us into Aristotelian phronesis territory (cf. 
Yu, 2007, pp. 150–152) – but I fail to see Mengzi providing enlightenment here in areas 
where Aristotle leaves us in the dark.  
More specifically, I agree with Kim that if one reads Mengzi closely, there is very little 
advice on emotional cultivation in him that goes beyond a rather narrow Aristotelian 
habituation picture of enculturation and socialisation (Kim, 2008, chap. 6.3). We learn to 
extend the boundaries of our emotions by emulating and reflecting upon moral exemplars 
who do. Disappointingly, however, even this reflection seems to be reliant on the 
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indoctrination of basic assumptions, picked up from authoritative sages as role models. If one 
comes to Mengzi’s account of emotional cultivation hoping for an extension and educative 
application of his ideas about elevation (as a form of jìng), focused on transpersonal ideals, 
one’s hopes will be dashed. Mengzi falls back on a standard, Aristotle-like, account of 
learning from moral exemplars, and we are none the wiser about the precise methods to be 
used in the home or the classroom to facilitate such learning in a non-indoctrinatory way.  
This last comment is, however, less a complaint about Mengzi or Aristotle than it speaks 
to the need of virtue ethicists getting their hands dirty and complementing their psycho-moral 
accounts of learning from moral exemplarity with some more specific practical advice about 
how the emotions targeting such exemplarity can be cultivated in a reflective, phronesis-
sensitive, way. After all, as Aristotle drily remarks, the purpose of moral inquiry ‘is not to 
know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would be of no benefit 
to us’ (1985, p. 35 [1103b27–29]). 
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